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Abstract: This paper aims to test for causality between two dividend policies (dividend payout and 
dividend reinvestment plans) and return on equity as a measure of financial performance. Dividend 
policies issues have been continually debated around the world with mixed results, and yet to date, no 
definite conclusions have been reached. The study used 250 commercial banks from 30 SSA countries 
over the period between 2006 and 2015 to run long-run causality tests. The results from the block 
exogeneity Wald test from the panel vector error correction model, and the pairwise Granger causality 
test shows that there is a unidirectional causality between return on equity and dividend payout ratio. 
This implies no causality between dividend payout ratio and banks’ return on equity over the study 
period. Hence, we conclude that the widely adopted model for the payment of dividends in the SSA 
banking market is a win-lose game, as there is no causality between dividend payment and bank 
performance. As such, we recommend that other dividend policies that can minimize future financing 
costs, increase bank assets, and improve the future growth prospects of the region be explored.  
Keywords: Dividend policy; Sub-Saharan Africa; Commercial banks; Causality test; Vector Error 
Correction Model 
JEL Classifications: G21; L10; L21 
 
1. Background 
While maximising shareholders’ wealth is the main corporate goal of any firm, how 
to achieve this is up to the individual firm. This goal is achieved through adequate 
consideration of other stakeholders’ interests, short- and long-term financial 
planning and the implementation of various policies and strategies. (Andriof et al., 
2017) A 2014 International Monetary Fund (IMF) summary noted that the ratio of 
bank assets to GDP is too low in most SSA countries except for South Africa and 
Mauritius. The summary and the Global Economy report list the ratio of bank assets 
to GDP as 44.1%, 18.91%, 18.25%, 14.85% and 12.05% in Kenya, Tanzania, 
                                                             
1 Department of Management Accounting, Faculty of Accounting and Informatics, Durban University 
of Technology, South Africa, Address: Ritson Campus, 7 Ritson Road, Durban, South Africa, 
Corresponding author:  OdunayoO@dut.ac.za. 
AUDŒ, Vol. 14, no. 3, pp. 254-277 
ISSN: 2065-0175                                                                                              ŒCONOMICA 
255 
Nigeria, Madagascar and Equatorial Guinea, respectively. This is due to the failure 
of SSA banks to use their earnings as a source of cheap equity that would enable 
them to operate at full growth potential, promote financial stability and contribute 
meaningfully to economic growth. (Mlachila et al., 2013b)  
 
 
Figure 1. Bank asset-to-GDP ratio in selected SSA Countries in 2014 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data sourced from TheGlobaleconomy.com and 
The International Monetary Fund 
From Figure 1, the two countries with the highest bank assets to GDP ratio were 
Rwanda (53.8%) and Namibia (50.81%), while the others were below 50%. Over the 
past two decades, the banking sector in SSA has undergone dramatic changes which 
have led to accelerated economic growth, with commercial banks making the largest 
contribution. (Beck & Cull, 2013) According to Mlachila et al. (2013c), most 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa have an annual growth rate of 5.25%. While some 
commercial banks are well capitalized, which enabled them to survive the 2007-2009 
global financial crisis, they are considered underdeveloped and are not in a position 
to sustain future growth prospects in the region. (Mecagni et al., 2015) 
The financial system remains the engine of growth for SSA economies and is bank-
based. (Moyo et al., 2014) The banking sector makes up more than 70% of this 
system and accounts for the biggest share of financial assets. (Akande & Kwenda, 
2017, Enoch et al., 2015, Allen et al., 2011) However, in comparison with other 
regions, SSA banks are immature, underdeveloped, highly concentrated and 
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generally inefficient when it comes to financial intermediation, inhibiting their 
growth. (Allen et al., 2011; Kablan, 2010; Mlachila et al., 2013a) Hindrances to their 
development include a low asset base, weak creditors’ rights mechanisms, and 
limited access to financial services, high poverty rates and the small size of national 
markets in most countries.  
The low asset base and its consequences is one of the major constraints to economic 
growth in the region. (Mlachila et al., 2013a) Should this problem remain 
unresolved, it will result in instability, regressive performance, a lack of stakeholder 
confidence, inability to diversify, huge financing costs, and a poor contribution to 
economic growth which will threaten the banks’ survival. Since the banking sector 
is the engine of growth for sub-Saharan Africa, such challenges will hinder the 
growth of the entire region. There is thus a need to examine what constitute bank 
assets and how they can be increased to contribute meaningfully to the economic 
growth of the SSA region. An optimal dividend policy is a tool that can be used by 
commercial banks to minimise the total agency costs of debt and equity. (Shao et al., 
2013) Jensen and Meckling (1976) identify two types of agency costs, the cost of 
debt arising from conflict between shareholders and debt holders and that of equity 
stemming from conflict between managers and shareholders. Both types of agency 
costs affect bank performance and should be minimised in formulating dividend 
policy. (Shao et al., 2013) A dividend policy that will minimise agency costs and 
increase bank performance is crucial to achieve corporate goals. (Patra et al., 2012) 
The agency costs of both debt and equity that emanate from the separation of 
ownership must be adequately minimised. (Shao et al., 2013) 
It remains unclear why SSA banks still pay dividends and what drives their dividend 
payout policy even though they are characterised by strong concentration, weak 
creditors’ rights and a low asset base which are impediments to their operational 
diversification, sustainability and future growth. According to Nnadi et al. (2013), 
most African firms, including banks, pay annual cash dividends to their shareholders. 
As shown in the graph below, SSA commercial banks, they consistently pay 
dividends and the return on equity (ROE) and assets (ROA) which are measures of 
performance are decreasing. As at 2010, the averaged dividend payout ratio for the 
selected countries increased dramatically, while the ROA and ROE fell, but picked 
up in 2011 when the dividend payout ratio (DPOR) started decreasing. 





Combined Graph of Dividend and  
Performance b) Dividend payout Ratio 
in SSA banks 










Figure 2. SSA dividend and performance graphs 
Source: Authors’ computation from data collected from BankScope for 2006-2015. Note 
that only 30 SSA countries are represented 
Ongoing payment of dividends by SSA banks makes no provision to reduce future 
financing costs which will increase assets, and boost banks’ performance and growth 
potential. This is because banks’ earnings are important sources of equity that, if re-
invested, lead to safe/healthy banking which promotes financial stability and 
consequently, enhances economic growth. Shao et al. (2013) posit that dividend 
policy is a crucial firm decision which leads to a conflict of interest between 
shareholders and creditors (depositors and debt-holders). An optimal dividend policy 
enables firms to manage the divergent interests of creditors and shareholders. 
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Dividend payments reduce shareholders’ fears of expropriation by managers 
(insiders), while aggravating creditors’ concerns about expropriation by 
shareholders. (Byrne & O’Connor, 2017) This is because a rational shareholder is 
more interested in the share price and dividend income than the riskiness of bank 
operations. (Mehran et al., 2011) 
Notwithstanding, studies such as Agyei and Marfo-Yiadom (2011), Abiola (2014), 
Ehikioya (2015), and Abdella and Manual (2016) have revealed the correlation 
between dividend policy (mostly payout policy) and performance both in the banking 
and non-banking sector, even though it is not clear which between payout and 
retention policies will minimize agency problems and improve performance. 
Granger (1969) opined that it is meaningful and essential to test for causation as 
opposed to correlation or regression, because correlation/regression is a relationship 
that does not necessarily imply causation. Causal analysis eliminates the effect of 
intervention between variables and shows the cause and effect relationship. (Akinlo 
& Egbetunde, 2010) The absence of studies in this direction in SSA banking and the 
continuous debate on dividend policy make it imperative for this study to investigate 
the causal relationship between dividend policies (both retention and dividend 
payout) and financial performance of banks in SSA countries. Although it has been 
established that there is a feedback relationship between dividend policy and bank 
performance (Hamid, Yaqub & Awan, 2016), the form this policy should take to 
foster effective performance is still a gap that this study intends to bridge. Therefore, 
this study weighs the two common dividend policies in banking sector and 
establishes the causal relationship between each of them and bank performance in 
the SSA region. Since the focus of this objective is to test causality, block exogeneity 
Wald and pairwise Granger causality tests were conducted. This is different from the 
test of feedback relationship that has been done in previous research. 
The paper is structured into 6 sections for logical presentation. The next section 
contains the literature review, which is followed by the theoretical underpinning in 
section three. The methodology is captured in section four, model estimation in 
section five, and conclusion in section six.  
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1. Empirical Review 
Few studies have empirically examined the relationship between dividend policy and 
performance in the banking sector. Hamid et al. (2016) recent study investigated 
Pakistan banks’ dividend policy. The results of the FEM showed that tax and 
financial slack (retained earnings) had no significant effect on bank performance. It 
is pertinent to examine if retained earnings impact performance despite its 
insignificant effect. Waseem et al. (2011) examined dividend policy and 
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performance stability among 17 listed commercial banks in Jordan for the period 
2000-2006 using pooled EGLS (cross-sectional random effect). The result showed 
that the cash dividend policy is unstable in Jordanian banks and hence has a negative 
effect on their performance. Agyei and Marfo-Yiadom (2011) examined 16 
Ghanaian commercial banks for the period 1999 to 2003. Using the fixed and random 
effect model estimation, they found that, dividend paying banks enhanced their 
performance. This requires further enquiry because the study was silent on banks 
that retain earnings to enhance growth. There is a need to weigh both policies to 
determine which tends to promote bank performance. Evidence from Bangladesh for 
the period 2008 to 2010 using regression analysis showed that variations in dividend 
policy did not explain variations in the returns on shares among the listed commercial 
banks. (Zaman, 2011)  
The review of the literature shows that, the majority of studies focused on non-
banking sectors. Ouma (2012) examined Kenyan listed firms for the period 2002 to 
2010 using regression analysis. The study found a strong and positive relationship 
between dividend payouts and firm performance. However, it did not consider other 
dividend policies. Ajanthan (2013) analysed the effect of dividend payouts on the 
performance of hotels and restaurants in Sri Lanka using multiple regression 
estimation. The study found a strong and positive relationship between dividend 
payouts and firm performance. Priya and Nimalathasan (2013) employed regression 
analysis to investigate hotels and restaurants in the same country for the period 2008 
to 2012. The study found a significant positive relationship between dividend policy 
and firm performance. However, it did not specify the kind of dividend policy that 
influenced performance. Evidence from Nigerian manufacturing firms presented by 
Uwuigbe et al. (2012) and Ehikioya (2015) showed that dividend payouts 
significantly and positively impacts firm performance. However, both studies 
neglect retention policy and this requires further clarification as payout is not the 
only dividend policy. There are always some shareholders that prefer to retain profit 
to grow the firm and avoid external borrowing to finance viable investment projects. 
Furthermore, firms with financial constraints pay significantly lower dividends than 
those that are financially buoyant. (Obembe et al., 2014) Evidences from past 
research have shown conflicting findings on which dividend policy (payout or 
retention) should be adopted in firms such that the managers will maximize wealth 
and not profit even though majority believe banks should pay out. There is a 
discrepancy in the various theories on the choice of dividend policy and empirical 
findings have shown that not all firms that pay out have prospects of positive future 
performance as a result. Studies have shown that dividend policy has a great effect 
on bank performance, irrespective of the particular policy adopted. However, the 
policy that will cause performance has not been identified because correlation does 
not mean causality. 
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2.2. Theoretical Underpinning 
Life Cycle Theory of Dividend 
The life cycle theory of the firm was propounded by Mueller (1972) and the life 
cycle theory of dividends was developed by Bulan and Subramanian (2009) and 
Thanatawee (2011). The major argument of this theory is that the stage a firm has 
reached in its life cycle determines its optimal dividend policy. The life cycle runs 
from inception to maturity with many circumstances arising along the way, including 
a declining growth rate, shrinking investment opportunities, and the decreased cost 
of raising capital externally. The optimal dividend policy involves a trade-off 
between the costs and benefits associated with raising capital for new projects taking 
life-cycle-related factors into account. Dividend policies change over the life cycle 
of a firm, and, surprisingly, as a firm matures, its ability to explore profitable 
investment opportunities is overtaken by its ability to generate cash.  
The relationship between a firm’s life cycle and dividend policy is shown 
schematically below: 
Stage of Growth      Dividend Policy 
 
Introduction Undecided 
Rapid Growth  Higher 
retention policy 
Maturity Stage   Increased 
payout policy 




3.1. Research Design and Data Source 
Following, to name but a few, Díez Esteban and López de Foronda Pérez (2001), 
Flamini et al. (2009), Nnadi et al. (2013), Francis (2013) and Akande and Kwenda 
(2017) regional studies on African or SSA banks that used unbalanced panel datasets 
from several commercial banks, this study is based on unbalanced panel of 250 
commercial banks from 30 SSA countries. As noted in the previous chapter, all these 
countries have similar economic and banking features such that their banking 
markets are oligopolistic in nature. Panel data was used to cater for the heterogeneity 
problem that individual bank characteristics might cause. (Hsiao, 2014) Not all the 
data required to capture the variables of interest were available for all the SSA 
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countries for the study period; hence, it was unbalanced. The unbalanced panel data 
analysis approach was used rather than a balanced panel because we are less 
interested in goodness of fit and more concerned with understanding the explanatory 
and illuminating powers of the specific variables, using the available data. The 
annual data were collected from BankScope database by Fitch/IBCA Bureau Van 
Dijk covering the period 2006 to 2015. The SSA countries considered in this study 
exclude those regarded as outliers such as South Africa and Mauritius due their 
highly competitive and sophisticated banking systems. (Beck & Cull, 2013) 
Countries such as such as Democratic Republic of Congo, Comoros, Guinea-Bissau, 
Sao Tome and Principle and that lacked data due to the effects of war were also 
excluded. (Akande & Kwenda, 2017; Flamini et al., 2009) The countries selected are 
bank-based economies in which commercial banking holds more than 70% of 
financial system assets on average. They have similar economic and banking 
characteristics such as weak creditors’ rights, underdeveloped infrastructure, high 
inflation and poverty rates, external shocks, high concentration, a shallow financial 
system and non-adherence to global regulatory requirements. (Akande & Kwenda, 
2017; Allen et al., 2014; Flamini et al., 2009) 
3.2. Model Specification 
Theories such as the bird-in-the-hand theory, the signaling hypothesis, as well as the 
empirical findings of Agyei and Marfo-Yiadom (2011); Zakaria, Muhammad, and 
Zulkifli (2012); and Hamid et al. (2016) have averred the feedback relationship 




That is,  
Performance = f (dividend policies) 
As recently noted by Hamid et al. (2016), though dividend policies are unstable in 
the banking sector, there are two commonly adopted policies: dividend payout policy 
(in form of cash) and dividend re-investment plan (DRIP). Note that DRIP is 
otherwise called retention policy.  
Hence,  
Performance = f (dividend payout ratio, retention ratio)
 
To avoid the omission of a germane variable which can lead to a simultaneity bias, 
the capital adequacy ratio is included as a control variable. 
 ),,( itititit CARRERADPORfROE   
(ii)
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ititititit uCARRERADPORiROE  321   
(iii)
 
All variables are in their natural form. 
321,  and
 
are the estimated parameters of the respective explanatory variables 
which show the percentage change in financial performance caused by percentage 
change in the explanatory variables;  
0  

















3.3. Estimating Technique 
Specifically, Pairwise Granger Causality and Granger causality tests from the Panel-
Vector Error Correction Block Exogeneity Wald test were used to establish both the 
short and long run uni-directional, bi-directional causality or no-causal relationships 
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0000 ,,,   are respective constants. 51515151
,,,    
are respective estimated coefficients ∆ denotes the first difference operator. 1tECT  
represents the one-year lagged Error Correction Term. It is the co-integrating vector 
that acts as the speed of adjustment for the long run association between the 
variables. 
itit uu 41   are mutually uncorrelated stochastic (white noise) error terms 
with finite covariance matrix and zero mean value. t  is the time period that ranges 
from 10,.......2,1 , i  is the cross-section (banks) that ranges from 250,........2,1  and 
lastly, k is the number of lags while p is the optimal lag length selected by using the 
Sequential modified LR test statistic, Final Prediction Error, Akaike Information 
Criterion (AIC), Schwarz Bayesian criterion (SBC), and Hannan-Quinn information 
criterion. To conduct a multivariate causality test, itCAR , which is the measure of 
Capital Adequacy Ratio, was included to avoid the omission of germane variables 
that can cause simultaneity bias and thereby lead to a bogus relationship between the 
variables. (Gujarati & Porter, 2003) For any commercial bank to adopt a policy, it 
must be adequately capitalized to justify the continuity of banking activities and 
hence, their persistent future growth. This follows from the fact that banks avert risk 
by maintaining a high degree of capitalization. 
 
4. Model Estimation and Interpretation of Findings 
4.1. Preliminary Analysis 
4.1.1. Summary Statistics 
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This section shows the description of the characteristics of the variables ranging from 
the mean, median, maximum, minimum, standard deviation, skewness, kurtosis, and 
probability of the distribution. 
Table 1. Descriptive Analysis 
 ROE RERA CAR DPOR 
 Mean  0.198431  0.544922  0.135358  0.459001 
 Median  0.222880  0.567239  0.112732  0.437637 
 Maximum  13.88820  1.000000  1.073452  2.670570 
 Minimum -31.53604 -1.670570 -2.067475  0.000000 
 Std. Dev.  0.859533  0.241318  0.133588  0.237609 
 Skewness -21.07763 -0.849753  0.005022  0.866069 
 Kurtosis  827.0631  7.155175  58.96471  7.421875 
 Probability  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
Source: Author’s estimation, 2018 
Table 1 shows the descriptive analysis results of all the activities regarding the causal 
relationship of dividend policy and bank performance for the period between 2006 
and 2015. return on equity (ROE) measured the performance of the banking industry 
while dividend payout ratio (DPOR), retention ratio (RERA), and capital adequacy 
ratio (CAR) were used to capture the dividend policy. The result revealed that the 
average ROE, DPOR, RERA, and CAR are 0.20, 0.46, 0.54, and 0.14, respectively. 
This result implies that the average performance of the banking industry as 
determined by the return on equity is small and not encouraging. The maximum & 
the minimum values for rate of ROE, DPOR, RERA, and CAR are: 13.89 & -31.54, 
2.67 & 0.00, 0.98 & -8.31, 1.00 & -1.67, and 1.07 & -2.07, respectively. The standard 
deviation values of 0.86, 0.24, 0.24, and 0.13 revealed the rate at which the ROE, 
DPOR, RERA, and CAR, respectively, deviated from their respective average or 
expected values. Also, it was discovered that CAR and DPOR, which are 0.01 and 
0.87 respectively, are positively skewed because their distribution has a long tail to 
the right. On the other hand, ROE and RERA which are -21.08, and -0.85 
respectively, are negatively skewed because their distribution has long tail to the left. 
However, the kurtosis of the financial variables showed that all the variables under 
consideration are leptokurtic in nature because the kurtosis coefficient indexes are 
all positive. The Jarque-Bera and probability values revealed ROE, DPOR, RERA, 
and CAR are not normally distributed, but statistically significant when examining 
the impact of dividend policy on the performance of SSA banking industry. 
4.1.2. Panel Unit Root Test 
To run analysis on secondary data, it is necessary to run stationarity tests in order to 
know the nature of data and avoid spurious estimations. As noted by Akinlo and 
Egbetunde (2010), none of the unit root tests is free from size and power properties 
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shortcomings. Thus, to be affirmative about the order of integration, several unit root 
tests are conducted in this study as shown in table 2 below. 
Table 2. Panel unit root test at level for the variables 
Variables Levin, Lin & Chu 
t* Statistic 
Prob ADF Statistic Prob PP Statistic Prob 
ROE -59.6740 0.0000 18.4207 0.0001 18.4207 0.0001 
RERA -2.88111 0.0020 136.346 0.0000 147.042 0.0000 
CAR -5.64249 0.0000 195.317 0.0000 212.920 0.0000 
DPOR -8.75976 0.0000 188.866 0.0000 163.428 0.0000 
Source: Author’s estimation, 2018 
The panel unit root test presented in Table 2 above shows that all the variables were 
stationary. The ROE, dividend policy ratio (DPOR), retention ratio (RERA), and 
capital adequacy ratio (CAR) were all stationary at order one for both cross-section 
and individual level during the period under investigation. This is evident as the 
probability of Levin, Lin and Chur t-statistic values: 0.000, 0.002, 0.000 and 0.000; 
the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test-statistic and Philip Perron statistic values: 
0.000, 0.000, 0.000, 0.000 and 0.000 for each of the variables was less than the 
probability of the error margin 0.05 allowed for the estimate in this study. This result 
implies that there is a short-run equilibrium relationship among the variables under 
investigation. The short-run stability of these variables revealed by the panel unit 
root test led to the estimation of co-integration to determine the long-run equilibrium 
relationship or stability of the linear combination of the variables in the long-run. 
4.1.3. Panel Co-integration Test 
Since all our variables at non-stationary at order one (1), a co-integration test was 
used to establish the long-run relationship between the variables using the Johansen 
methodology. Johansen’s approach derives two likelihood estimators for the co-
integrating rank: a trace test and a maximum Eigen value test. The co-integrating 
rank was formally tested using the trace and the maximum eigen value statistic.  
Table 3. Co-integration Rank Test using Trace Statistic 
Eigen value Trace Statistic 5% Critical Value Prob Hypothesized No. of 
CE(s) 
0.220906 1933.973 69.81889 1.0000 None * 
0.165168 935.2810 29.79707 0.0001 At most 1 * 
0.124231 527.2958 15.49471 0.0001 At most 2 * 
0.095763 227.5006 3.841466 0.0000 At most 3 * 
Source: Author’s estimation, 2018 
Note that * represents the significance of the test statistics 
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Table 4. Co-integration Rank Test using Maximum Eigen Value Statistic 




Prob Hypothesized No. of 
CE(s) 
0.220906 564.1485 33.87687 0.0001 None * 
0.165168 407.9852 21.13162 0.0001 At most 1 * 
0.124231 299.7953 14.26460 0.0001 At most 2 * 
0.095763 227.5006 3.841466 0.0000 At most 3 * 
Source: Author’s estimation, 2018 
Note that * represents the significance of the test statistics 
These test statistics indicate three co-integrating vectors at 5 percent level of 
significance as presented in Tables 3 and 4 above. This implies that a long-run 
equilibrium relationship exists among the variables under study. Thus, the stability 
of the dividend policy captured by the DPOR, RERA, and CAR has affected SSA 
banks’ performance measured by ROE in both the short and long-run. The above 
tables also show, that the maximum-eigen value test indicates three normalized co-
integrating equation(s) at 5 percent significant level. The details of these three 
normalized co-integrating equations and their adjustment coefficients are presented 
in Table 5 below. 
Table 5. Co-integration Equations 
ROE RERA CAR DPOR 
 1.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.068027 
    (0.03589) 
 0.000000  1.000000  0.000000  0.377640 
    (0.01003) 
 0.000000  0.000000  1.000000  0.182568 
    (0.01407) 
Adjustment coefficients (standard error in parentheses) 
D(ROE) -0.912529  0.047255 -0.063485 
  (0.03621)  (0.17490)  (0.08983) 
D(RERA) -0.005543 -0.369680 -0.205679 
  (0.00864)  (0.04174)  (0.02144) 
D(CAR)  0.007637  0.050936 -0.053140 
  (0.00428)  (0.02069)  (0.01063) 
D(DPOR) -0.008845 -0.200160 -0.352320 
  (0.00835)  (0.04032)  (0.02071) 
Source: Author’s estimation, 2018 




Figure 3. Graphical Representation of Cointegrating Equations 
Source: Author’s estimation, 2018 
Table 5 and Figure 3 present the normalized co-integrating equation(s) coefficients 
with their standard error in parentheses. The normalized co-integrating coefficients 
only load on the dividend payout ratio with both positive and negative coefficients. 
The coefficients of the dividend payout ratio, 0.068, 0.378 and 0.183 are statistically 
significant based on the standard error test. This implies that banking performance 
as shown by the cointegrating equations can be determined by future-state and the 
stability of ROE, RERA, and CAR while the DPOR mainly determines the current 
level of banking performance and its movement in the right direction to bring the 
system back to equilibrium. The co-integration adjusted coefficients measure the 
long-run equilibrium or stability of banking performance. The ROE value of -0.913 
in the first co-integrating equation reveals the performance level of the selected SSA 
banks which is not encouraging and calls for improvement. The adjustment 
coefficients values of -0.006 and -0.009 from co-integrating equation one reveal the 
negative impact of the RERA and DPOR, both dividend policies, on banking 
performance. However, the capital adequacy ratio value of 0.007 contributes 
positively to SSA banking performance. In the second co-integrating equation, the 
performance of the banking industry improved, as the performance level stood at 
0.047. This was hampered in the third equation as a result of the negative impact of 
the DPOR in the first and second co-integrating equation which limits the 
performance of the banking industry by 0.009 and 0.200, respectively. The negative 
impact of the retention ratio in the second co-integrating equation also hampered 
SSA bank performance during the period under study. This implies that the more 
attention that is devoted to formulating effective dividend policy, the better will be 
the performance of the SSA banking industry.  
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4.1.4. Optimal Lag Selection 
Table 6. VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria 
Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
0 -2654.561 NA   9.20e-06  2.593428  2.607144  2.598458 
1 -1527.413  2247.701  3.14e-06  1.518686  1.600979  1.548864 
2 -1437.331  179.1966  2.95e-06  1.455223  1.606093*  1.510549* 
3 -1403.290  67.55168  2.92e-06*  1.446407*  1.665854  1.526880 
4 -1385.211  35.78683  2.94e-06  1.453156  1.741181  1.558778 
5 -1362.029  45.77771  2.95e-06  1.454928  1.811530  1.585698 
6 -1335.590  52.07799  2.94e-06  1.453525  1.878705  1.609443 
7 -1321.220  28.23597  2.97e-06  1.463891  1.957647  1.644957 
8 -1295.670  50.07920*  2.97e-06  1.463354  2.025688  1.669568 
Source: Author’s estimation, 2018 
Table 6 shows the result of the vector autoregressive lag length to choose the optimal 
lag for this study. The result shows a lag order of three (3) using the Akaike 
information criterion with a value of 1.446 while the lag order of two (2) using the 
Schwarz information criterion and Hannan-Quinn information criterion has values 
of 1.606 and 1.511, respectively. All these information criteria were statistically 
significant at 5 percent level. Based on this evidence, lag order two (2) which was 
the smallest minimum lag order revealed by Schwarz information criterion and 
Hannan-Quinn information criterion was selected for this study.  
4.2. Panel Vector Error Correction Model Estimation 
A Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) is a restricted Vector Auto- Regression 
(VAR) used for non-stationary cointegrated series. Therefore, since our series is 
cointegrated, a VECM with four (4) simultaneous equations is estimated in this study 
to evaluate the short-run properties of the long-run relationships among ROE, 
DPOR, RERA and CAR. Optimal lag two (2) of SIC was chosen for this estimation 
as noted by Hyndman and Athanasopoulos (2014) that SIC is the most suitable for 
VECM as AIC tends to choose larger number of lags that make the estimate 
insignificant.  
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Table 7. Vector Error Correction Estimates 
Cointegrating Eq:  CointEq1 CointEq2 CointEq3  
ROE(-1)  1.000000  0.000000  0.000000  
RERA(-1)  0.000000  1.000000  0.000000  
CAR(-1)  0.000000  0.000000  1.000000  
DPOR(-1)  0.068027  0.377640  0.182568  
  (0.03592)  (0.01003)  (0.01408)  
C1 -0.131002 -0.183238  0.038462  
Error Correction: D(ROE) D(RERA) D(CAR) D(DPOR) 
CointEq1 -0.912529 -0.005543  0.007637  0.008815 
  (0.03624)  (0.00865)  (0.00429)  (0.02657) 
CointEq2  0.047255 -0.369680  0.050936 -0.504038 
  (0.17502)  (0.04177)  (0.02070)  (0.12831) 
CointEq3  0.108874  0.199250 -0.270764 -0.512624 
  (0.14556)  (0.03474)  (0.01722)  (0.03356) 
CointEq4 -0.063485 -0.205679 -0.053140 -0.352320 
  (0.08989)  (0.02145)  (0.01063)  (0.02072) 
D(ROE(-1)) -0.066835 -1.05E-05 -0.000862 -0.004100 
  (0.03043)  (0.00726)  (0.00360)  (0.00701) 
D(ROE(-2)) -0.034568 -0.002248 -0.000578  0.000651 
  (0.02241)  (0.00535)  (0.00265)  (0.00517) 
D(RERA(-1)) -0.006249 -0.296242 -0.038291  0.163172 
  (0.17328)  (0.04135)  (0.02050)  (0.03995) 
D(RERA(-2)) -0.162397 -0.097199 -0.025696  0.085151 
  (0.14162)  (0.03379)  (0.01675)  (0.03265) 
D(CAR(-1)) -0.014263 -0.156189 -0.100861  0.119614 
  (0.18496)  (0.04414)  (0.02188)  (0.04264) 
D(CAR(-2))  0.043268 -0.042329 -0.117200  0.013583 
  (0.17573)  (0.04194)  (0.02079)  (0.04052) 
D(DPOR(-1))  0.012641 -0.012609  0.003116  0.001286 
  (0.05576)  (0.01331)  (0.00659)  (0.01285) 
D(DPOR(-2))  0.005704  0.003621 -0.002557 -0.013647 
  (0.04561)  (0.01088)  (0.00539)  (0.01051) 
C2  8.81E-05  0.000140 -0.000235 -0.000130 
  (0.01882)  (0.00449)  (0.00223)  (0.00434) 
 R-squared  0.493118  0.267416  0.190113  0.288941 
 Adj. R-squared  0.489957  0.262848  0.185063  0.284507 
 Sum sq. resids  1797.073  102.3385  25.14159  95.52210 
 S.E. equation  0.894694  0.213507  0.105825  0.206274 
 F-statistic  156.0030  58.53543  37.64233  65.16166 
 Log likelihood -2947.799  290.3617  1876.613  368.2505 
 Akaike AIC  2.621946 -0.243683 -1.647445 -0.312611 
 Schwarz SC  2.659931 -0.205698 -1.609460 -0.274626 
 Mean dependent -0.000383 -0.000275 -0.000289  0.000223 
 S.D. dependent  1.252770  0.248675  0.117227  0.243860 
Source: Author’s estimation, 2018 
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The presence of cointegration between variables suggests a long-term relationship 
among the variables under consideration. The VCEM can then be applied. The vector 
error correction estimate with standard error in parenthesis for the long run 
relationship between dividend policy and banking performance for three co-
integrating equations is presented in Table 7 above. The C1 in the co-integrating 
equation are correctly signed, revealing that it will take 13 and 18 percent, 
respectively for the maladjustment in the co-integrating equation 1, and 2 to attain 
or adjust to the long run equilibrium or stability. In examining the impact of the error 
correction of the dividend policy on banking performance, it was found from the 
fitted VECM that ROE at lag one and two, RERA at lag one and two, and CAR at 
lag one have an inverse relationship with the banks’ ROE (performance). Thus, ROE 
at lag one and two, RERA at lag one and two, and CAR at lag one will worsen the 
banks’ ROE ratio (performance measure) by 6.68, 3.46, 0.62, 16.24, and 1.43 
percent, respectively. This implies that particular circumstances in the countries 
examined during the study period impacted the influence of the dividend retention 
policy on bank performance because all things being equal, this should not be a 
negative effect. This finding is contrary to Uwuigbe et al. (2012) and Agyei and 
Marfo-Yiadom (2011) studies that found that either payout or retention dividend 
policy has a positive relationship with performance. However, CAR at lag two, and 
DPOR at lags one and two have a direct relationship with banking performance. This 
is in tandem with the findings of Brighi and Venturelli (2014) and Odunga et al. 
(2013). The results further reveal that CAR at lag two and DPOR at lags one and two 
improved the performance of banking industry by 4.33, 1.26 and 0.57 percent, 
respectively. This positive effect reveals the signalling effect of dividends during this 
period such that it had a direct effect on bank performance as revealed by Ehikioya 
(2015). The positive relationship between capital adequacy and performance implies 
the significance of capital adequacy in formulating dividend policy. As noted by 
Nnadi et al. (2013), a bank must be adequately capitalised before making dividend 
decisions. The positive relationship further depicts the nexus between the capital 
ratio and funding costs. A bank with a high capital ratio incurs lower funding costs 
because of reduced bankruptcy costs. (Brighi & Venturelli, 2013) The C2 estimate 
of 8.81E-05 reveals that the banking industry’s performance could have been 
enhanced and improved through dividend policy during the period under 
investigation without serious risk. The significance of the VECM was examined 
using the R-square statistic and it was revealed that 49 percent of the variation in the 
error associated with the performance of SSA banks can be explained by the dividend 
policy captured by the RERA, CAR and DPOR. The F- statistic value of 156.00 ˃ 
F0.05 (3, 1714) = 3.00 shows that the fitted VECM was statistically significant and 
hence adequate and reliable in determining the causal relationship between the 
dividend policy and banking performance (ROE) in SSA. 
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4.2.1. P-VECM Stability Check 
 
Figure 4. Diagrammatic Representation of VECM Stability Condition Check 
Source: Author’s estimation, 2018 
The results in Figure 4 show the VECM stability condition for the relationship 
among ROE, RERA, CAR and DPOR. However, the figure shows that, all the roots 
or the eigen values were within the unit circle. This implies that the VECM satisfied 
the stability condition. It can hence be used for policy formulation and 
implementation. 
4.3. Granger Causality Test 
According to Fisher (1993), economic theory guarantees causality in at least one 
direction of any cointegrated series. Therefore, there is need to test for causality in 
this study. Table 8 shows the block exogeniety Wald test following the study 
conducted by Gul and Ekinci (2006) where it was posited that causality can be 
established using probability and chi-square statistics under the null hypothesis of 
no causality. 
Table 8. VEC Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Tests 
Dependent variable: D(ROE) 
Excluded Chi-sq D.f. Prob. 
D(RERA)  1.930692 2  0.3809 
D(CAR)  0.087883 2  0.9570 
D(DPOR)  1.756823 2  0.4154 
All  6.394357 6  0.6031 
Dependent variable: D(RERA) 
D(ROE)  0.360031 2  0.8353 
D(CAR)  12.54067 2  0.0019*** 
D(DPOR)  17.95587 2  0.0001*** 
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All  37.31987 6  0.0000*** 
Dependent variable: D(CAR) 
D(ROE)  0.061813 2  0.9696 
D(RERA)  3.784374 2  0.1507 
D(DPOR)  19.16546 2  0.0001*** 
All  44.22851 6  0.0000*** 
Dependent variable: D(DPOR) 
D(ROE)  0.947218 2  0.6228 
D(RERA)  16.75244 2  0.0002*** 
D(CAR)  8.226999 2  0.0164** 
All  68.30802 6  0.0000*** 
Source: Author’s estimation, 2018 
Note that *** and ** represent rejection of Ho at 1% and 5% respectively 
The result of vector error correction Granger causality among the financial variables 
under consideration are presented in Table 8 above to show the direction of causal 
relations between each pair of the financial variables such as return on equity, 
retention ratio, capital adequacy ratio and dividend payout ratio. There is a 
unidirectional causality of error between the capital adequacy ratio and retention 
ratio; dividend payout ratio and retention ratio; and dividend payout ratio and capital 
adequacy ratio. It was also found that there was bidirectional causality of error 
between the retention ratio and dividend payout ratio; and capital adequacy ratio and 
dividend payout ratio. This is evident in the estimated probability of Chi-square 
statistic values of 0.002, 0.000; 0.016, and 0.001˂ 0.05. Thus, error as a result of the 
capital adequacy ratio and dividend payout ratio Granger causes error that arises as 
a result of the retention ratio; and errors as a result of the retention ratio and capital 
adequacy ratio Granger cause the dividend payout ratio. Furthermore, the combined 
error of return on equity, capital adequacy ratio and dividend payout ratio Granger 
causes error of the retention ratio. The combined error of return on equity, retention 
ratio, and dividend payout ratio Granger causes error of the capital adequacy ratio 
and the combined error from return on equity, retention ratio, and capital adequacy 
ratio Granger causes error that occurs from the dividend payout ratio at 5 percent 
level of significance. In other words, knowing the combined error from the retention 
ratio and dividend payout ratio, the level of error from the capital adequacy ratio can 
be determined. The combined error from return on equity, retention ratio and capital 
adequacy ratio also determines the level of error from the dividend payout ratio. 
Similarly, following the study conducted by Dhamala et al. (2008) where it was 
established that causality can be tested using F-statistics and probability values under 
the null hypothesis of no causality, the Pairwise causality test was used to test the 
causality between dividend policies and the ROE of SSA commercial banks as 
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shown in Table 9 below, since none of the policies granger cause ROE in the estimate 
of the block exogeneity Wald test.  
Table 9. Pairwise Granger Causality Test 
 Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability 
Decision on Null 
Hypothesis 
 RERA does not Granger Cause ROE 2401  0.23145  0.79340 Do not Reject 
 ROE does not Granger Cause RERA   0.96503  0.38112 Do not Reject 
 CAR does not Granger Cause ROE 2402  0.84799  0.42840 Do not Reject 
 ROE does not Granger Cause CAR   3.22989  0.03973** Reject 
 DPOR does not Granger Cause ROE 2363  0.96910  0.37958 Do not Reject 
 ROE does not Granger Cause DPOR   3.60122  0.02744** Reject 
 CAR does not Granger Cause RERA 2487  1.18586  0.30566 Do not Reject 
 RERA does not Granger Cause CAR   4.36451  0.01282*** Reject 
 DPOR does not Granger Cause RERA 2403  8.44241  0.00022*** Reject 
 RERA does not Granger Cause DPOR   20.3805  1.7E-09*** Reject 
 DPOR does not Granger Cause CAR 2404  1.18027  0.30737 Do not Reject 
 CAR does not Granger Cause DPOR   2.57339  0.04349** Reject 
Source: Author’s estimation, 2018 
Note that *** and ** represents rejection of Ho at 1% and 5% respectively 
The result of the Granger causality among the financial variables under consideration 
is presented in Table 9 to show the direction of causal relations between each pair of 
the financial variables such as ROE RERA, CAR and DPOR. The result shows that, 
there was a unidirectional causality between ROE and CAR; ROE and DPOR; 
RERA and CAR; and capital adequacy and DPOR and bidirectional causality 
between DPOR and RERA. This is evident from the estimated probability of F-
statistic values given as 0.039, 0.027, 0.013, 0.000, 0.002 and 0.004 ˂ 0.05.  
Thus, i) ROE Granger causes capital adequacy and this implies that banks’ returns 
determine their ability to be adequately capitalized.  
ii) ROE Granger causes DPOR, implying that the more banks earn from equity, the 
more they implement payout policy as against retention policy.  
iii) RERA Granger causes capital adequacy and this implies that the more banks 
adopt dividend reinvestment plans, the more they generate earnings to increase their 
assets and solidify their capital base. This will not only serve as a cushion in times 
of shocks but promote their future growth. 
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5. Conclusions and Recommendations 
Having established that RERA Granger causes bank performance using ROA and 
further conducting a robustness check using ROE as the measure of financial 
performance, our findings revealed that ROE Granger causes DPOR (unidirectional 
causality between ROE and DPOR) while neither DPOR nor RERA Granger cause 
ROE. This implies that when banks generate income from total shareholders’ equity, 
they will stick to payout policy even though this policy does not enhance their 
performance (ROE) in SSA. In conclusion, paying out does not create value because 
the unidirectional causality was from banks’ ROE to DPOR. A win-lose game will 
result if banks continue to payout, as is the case with SSA banks. An optimal 
dividend policy that promotes the firm’s future growth must cater for future 
financing and increased assets. This finding is logical as what is generated should 
normally determine what will be paid out. However, given that SSA regional 
economic growth depends solely on the financial system and that the banking sector 
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